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PROPERTY
W. Wade Berryhill*
The General Assembly made several minor changes affecting
property law in Virginia. The most significant of these changes was
the amendment of the Code's provisions regarding a spouse's
dower and curtesy interests in the separate estate of a deceased
spouse. In addition to this legislation, the Virginia Supreme Court
decided several cases dealing with varied property issues. The decisions discussed below are those which should have the most interest to the general practitioner. The real estate specialist, no doubt,
is already aware of most of them.
In the majority of the cases which follow, the Virginia Supreme
Court affirms and reinforces long-standing judicial precedent in
Virginia. The most significant development deals with zoning regulations and residential restrictive covenants which affect group
homes for the mentally handicapped. In another decision, the
court had the opportunity to recognize tortious interference with a
prospective contract for the sale of real estate as a cause of action
for the first time.
I.

1985

LEGISLATION

Although the 1985 session of the General Assembly made many
minor changes affecting several aspects of property law,' possibly
the most significant change was the codification of Jacobs v.
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.S., 1967,
Arkansas State University; J.D., 1972, University of Arkansas; LL.M., 1976, Columbia University. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of J. Thomas O'Brien, Jr., T.C.
Williams School of Law, University of Richmond, Class of 1986.
1. For examples of some areas affected, see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1511, -1513 (Cum.
Supp. 1985) (agricultural and forest districts); id. §§ 55-248.5, -248.9:1, -248.11, -248.39 (the
Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act); id. § 55-66.4:2 (certificates of satisfaction);
id. §§ 58.1-3928, -3929 (repealed by Acts of 1985), -3930 (place of recording); id. §§ 55-318,
-321 (division of fences); id. § 17.59 (authorizing the clerk of court to refuse any writing for
recordation unless (i) each person's surname, where it first appears is either underscored or
in capital letters, (ii) each page is numbered, and (iii) the code section under which any
exemption from recordation taxes is clearly set forth). This list is not intended to be comprehensive, but merely to highlight a few of the changes.
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Meade." In that decision, the Virginia Supreme Court interpreted
a provision in the Virginia Code3 which purported to exclude a
husband's right to curtesy in his deceased wife's sole separate equitable estate. The court, in construing the statute so as to avoid a
constitutional attack,4 relied upon a code provision which states
that dower and curtesy are to be "synonymous . . . for all pur-

poses," 5 and concluded that the "interchange of 'curtesy' and
'dower' requires substitution of 'husband' for 'wife' and 'him' for
'her.' "6 Thus, the court held that a surviving wife's right to dower
shall not attach to her husband's sole separate equitable estate.

The legislature codified this decision by eliminating all references to husband or wife and instead using the word "spouse." 7
II.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

A. Brokers' Commissions
In Burruss Timber Co. v. Frith,s the Virginia Supreme Court
found that a sale of stock and subsequent corporate merger which
transferred the total assets of a timber company was not a "sale of
land." Since the transaction was not "substantially the equivalent"
of the sales which the broker was authorized to make, the broker
was not entitled to receive a commission. Frith, the plaintiff broker, entered into an exclusive listing agreement with Burruss Land
and Lumber Company covering thirty-two parcels of land in
Southwest Virginia. Approximately three months later, Burruss
2. 227 Va. 284, 315 S.E.2d 383 (1984).
3. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-21 (Repl. Vol. 1980). Prior to amendment that provision read

as follows:
When no curtesy in separate estate. -A surviving husband shall not be entitled to
curtesy in the equitable separate estate of the deceased wife if such right thereto has
been expressly excluded by the instrument creating the same, or if such instrument,
executed heretofore or hereafter, describes the estate as her sole and separate equitable estate.

Id.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See Jacobs, 227 Va. at 287, 315 S.E.2d at 385.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19.1 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
227 Va. at 288, 315 S.E.2d at 385.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-21 (Cum. Supp. 1985), which now reads:
When no dower or curtesy in separate estate.-A surviving spouse shall not be entitled to dower or curtesy in the equitable separate estate of the deceased spouse if
such right thereto has been expressly excluded by the instrument creating the same,
or if such instrument, executed heretofore or hereafter, describes the estate as his or
her sole and separate equitable estate.
8. 228 Va. 701, 324 S.E.2d 679 (1985).
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Land and Lumber Company entered into an "open" listing agreement with another broker for the sale of all its assets in all states.
Frith assisted this broker by showing the Virginia parcels to Boston/Lyme Timber Company. Nearly three years later, Boston/
Lyme Timber Company purchased all of the shares of Burruss
Land and Lumber Company and merged with it to form Burruss
Timber Company, the defendant.
Frith brought an action against Burruss Timber Company for a
commission on the sale of the Virginia parcels. The trial court
made three findings: first, that although Frith's listing agreement
had no time frame, it had expired; second, that the stock transfer
and merger did amount to a sale of land; and finally, that Frith
was entitled to $80,000 in quantum meruit for procuring the sale.
The supreme court reversed the decision, distinguishing the four
out-of-state cases upon which Frith relied. 9 In each of those cases
the broker was employed to sell all of the corporation's assets. As
such, the stock sale, exchange, or merger was the "substantial
equivalent" of the sale for which the broker was employed. In the
instant case, however, Frith was employed to sell thirty-two tracts
of land in Virginia-only one-sixth of Burruss Land's total assets.
Transfer of all of its assets in four states was not the "substantial
equivalent" of the sales that Frith was authorized to make. Consequently, the court concluded that there was no sale of land entitling Frith to a commission. 10
B.

Contracts

1.

Tortious Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations

In Allen Realty Corp. v. Holbert," a case of first impression, 2
the Virginia Supreme Court found that the plaintiff, Allen Realty
Corporation (Allen) had stated a cause of action against Holbert
based upon tortious interference with a prospective contract. Allen
hired Rawlings, a firm of certified public accountants, to assist in
its liquidation, as well as to provide tax and accounting services
9. See Seward v. M. Seward & Son Co., 91 Conn. 190, 99 A. 887 (1916); Kingston Dev. Co.
v. Kenerly, 132 Ga. App. 346, 110 S.E.2d 118 (1974); Benedict v. Dakin, 243 M11.
384, 90 N.E.
712 (1910); Morad v. Haddad, 329 Mass. 730, 110 N.E.2d 364 (1953).
10. 228 Va. at 705-06, 324 S.E.2d at 682.
11. 227 Va. 441, 318 S.E.2d 592 (1984).
12. 227 Va. at 449, 318 S.E.2d at 597. The court noted that other jurisdictions had previously recognized the cause of action in question. See Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4th 195 (1981).
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and business advice. Holbert, the defendant and Rawlings' agent,
received several offers to buy Allen's real property but failed to
disclose an offer from the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing
Authority.13

Allen brought suit claiming, among other things, tortious interference with contractual relations on the part of Holbert. Holbert
demurred, and the trial court dismissed the action. The supreme
court reversed and found that Allen's motion for judgment sufficiently alleged Holbert's interference with Allen's prospective contractual relations. The court explained that "[t]he cause of action
arises from an intentional, improper interference with another's
contract relations, and this interference must (1) induce or otherwise cause a third-party not to enter into prospective contract with
the plaintiff, or (2) prevent the plaintiff from entering into a
contract."' 4
2. Anticipatory Repudiation of a Contract
In Link v. Weizenbaum, 5 the Virginia Supreme Court ruled

that where only one of two joint obligors to a contract anticipatorily repudiates, there is no breach of contract since the remaining
obligor is bound to perform. The defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Weizenbaum, jointly executed a contract to purchase property from
the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Link. Prior to the closing, Mr. Weizenbaum informed the Links' agent that he did not intend to close
on the property.
The Links filed suit against the Weizenbaums two days before
the scheduled closing, alleging anticipatory repudiation. No evidence was presented that Mrs. Weizenbaum was not willing to
close. The jury found for the Links, but the trial court set aside the
verdict as to Mrs. Weizenbaum. Subsequently, the trial court
granted Mr. Weizenbaum's motion to dismiss on the ground that
there was no breach of contract because his wife, being a joint obligor, was bound to close.
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court set out the requirements
for an anticipatory repudiation action, stating that "the repudiation must be clear and unequivocal, and it must cover the entire
13. The authority's offer, had it been accepted, would have amounted to a savings of over
$35,000 to Allen. Holbert, 227 Va. at 445, 318 S.E.2d at 594.
14. Id. at 449, 318 S.E.2d at 597.
15. 229 Va. 201, 326 S.E.2d 667 (1985).
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performance of the contract." ' Although Mr. Weizenbaum's repudiation was clear and unequivocal, it could not serve as a basis for
the action because Mrs. Weizenbaum did not join in the repudiation. Thus, the repudiation did not cover the entire performance of
the contract.
C. Deeds
In Amos v. Coffey, 11 the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
decision which held that a "Mother Hubbard" clause following a
metes and bounds description effectively conveyed the grantor's
one-twelfth remainder interest in real estate located in Pittsylvania County which was not intended to be included in the
metes and bounds description. The plaintiff, Mrs. Amos, executed
a deed to the defendant, Mr. Coffey, to convey "all of those certain
tracts or parcels of land-in or near the Town of Gretna. 1 18 Following a metes and bounds description of the parcels in Gretna,
the deed explicitly provided that it was the plaintiff's intention to
convey all of her real estate in Pittsylvania County.1 9
The plaintiff filed a bill of complaint asking the trial court to
construe the deed as having conveyed only the real estate located
in Gretna and not the one-twelfth remainder interest in her father's Pittsylvania County farm. The trial court held for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed because the trial court refused to
use extrinsic evidence in determining the meaning of the terms of
the deed. The supreme court, applying the "plain meaning" rule,
held that the deed was unambiguous on its face and affirmed. The
plaintiff contended that the broad, general language making up the
"Mother Hubbard" clause should be construed as merely a reference to the metes and bounds description. However, the supreme
court, relying on an earlier interpretation of the ejusdem generis
doctrine which they had adopted in Stephen Putney Shoe Co. v.
Richmond, Fredericksburg& Potomac Railroad Co.,20 found that
the metes and bounds description exhausted the particular class of
property in Gretna. Moreover, the supreme court ruled that the
16. Id. at 203, 326 S.E.2d at 668.
17. 228 Va. 88, 320 S.E.2d 335 (1984).
18. Id. at 90, 320 S.E.2d at 336.
19. The deed provided: "It is the intention of the party of the first part to convey to the
party of the second part all the real estate which they now own in Pittsylvania County,
Virginia, including but not restricted to the lands described above." Id.
20. 116 Va. 211, 220, 81 S.E. 93, 97 (1914).
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general description in the "Mother Hubbard" clause was effective
to convey the plaintiff's one-twelfth remainder interest in her father's Pittsylvania County farm.
D.

Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded

1.

Zoning

In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,2 the United
States Supreme Court struck down a local zoning ordinance which
required that a "special use" permit be obtained by the Cleburne
Living Center (CLC), a group home for the mentally retarded.2 2
The Cleburne City Council refused to issue CLC the permit citing,
inter alia, property owners' attitudes, the location of a junior high
school, fears of elderly residents, and the size of the home and
number of people to be housed.23
After the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas denied CLC relief, CLC appealed the case to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals and successfully argued that the zoning
ordinance violated the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. 24 The Fifth Circuit chose to view this as a case of
first impression, stating "we can find no appellate opinions directly
deciding the proper characterization of mentally retarded persons
for Equal Protection analysis. '25 The court of appeals concluded
that while mental retardates were not a suspect class, they did
share enough characteristics with a suspect class to be viewed as a
"quasi-suspect" class. 26 The court of appeals declared that laws
discriminating against a "quasi-suspect" class warranted intermediate scrutiny. 27 This level of judicial scrutiny rendered the ordinance invalid for want of substantially furthering an important
21. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
22. Section 8 of Cleburne's zoning ordinance listed the permitted uses of an R-3 district,
in which the Cleburne Living Center site was located. Apartment houses, multiple dwellings,
boarding and lodging houses, fraternity and sorority houses, dormitories, hotels, hospitals,
sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the aged, private clubs and fraternal organizations were all allowed. Section 16, subdivision 9 of the same ordinance required that special use permits be obtained for "hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, or alcoholics or
drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions to be operated anywhere in the city." Id.
at 3252-53 n.3.
23. Id. at 3259.
24. 726 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1984).
25. Id. at 196.
26. Id. at 198.
27. Id.
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After rehearing was denied,29 the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and held that the mentally retarded were not a
quasi-suspect class.30 As such, no intermediate scrutiny was to be
applied. Rather, "the Equal Protection Clause requires only that
the classification drawn by the statute be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest." 31
Yet, even with the wide latitude given state interest under the
rational relationship test, the Court further held that no rational
relationship could be found by requiring the CLC to obtain a special use permit. Any differences between a group home for the
mentally retarded and boarding houses or hospitals were held to be
irrelevant to the city's legitimate interests.2
2. Restrictive Covenants
In contrast to the zoning restrictions struck down by the United
States Supreme Court,33 the Virginia Supreme Court, in Omega
Corp. v. Malloy,34 addressed the issue of whether a restrictive covenant limiting the use of property to residential purposes and single-family dwellings would exclude group homes for the mentally
retarded. Omega had purchased two lots, one in each of two residential subdivisions. They proposed to build a dwelling on each
"to provide mentally retarded adults with normal residential housing in a community setting including the activities and life-style
incident to such a setting."35 Homeowners in both subdivisions
28. The city of Cleburne argued Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) and Doe v.
Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3rd Cir. 1979), pointing out the fact that no classification of heightened scrutiny was afforded the mentally retarded. The city also pointed out that heightened
scrutiny had never been used in the testing of a zoning ordinance. Only a rational basis
criterion should be required for a local government objective.
29. 735 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1984).
30. 105 S. Ct. at 3251.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 3259.
33. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
34. 228 Va. 12, 319 S.E.2d 728 (1984).
35. Id. at 14, 319 S.E.2d at 729. Testimony revealed that the homes were to be licensed by
the commonwealth and that the occupants were to be supervised by counselors employed by
Chesterfield County Mental Retardation Services. Each home was to be occupied by four
moderately mentally retarded adults who were to "leave the homes in early morning for
work, vocational training or some other day activity" and return in late afternoon. Id. Time
at home would be supervised by the counselors and would be spent cleaning, cooking, and
performing other household chores as well as engaging in various leisure activities. Although
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sought injunctions to restrain Omega from using its lots for the
proposed group homes on the grounds that each subdivision contained the following identical, restrictive covenant:
No lot shall be used except for residentialpurposes. No building
shall be erected, altered, placed, or permitted to remain on any lot
other than one detached single-family dwelling not to exceed two
stories in height.3 6
The chancellor granted both permanent injunctions. In his letter
opinion, the chancellor stated:
I believe that the restrictive covenants in question limit the use of
the buildings to single family dwellings, as well as the type of construction. I believe that a single family dwelling means what it says.
Only one family can inhabit the dwelling .... A single family use
does not include occupancy
by unrelated persons who live in the
37
home with a counselor.
On appeal Omega disagreed with the chancellor's analysis, contending that the first sentence of the covenants created a "use restriction" while the second sentence merely imposed a "structural
restriction." Although the lots were restricted to residential purposes, Omega asserted that the "structural restriction" merely controls "the type of buildings that may be constructed, not the type
of persons who might choose to live in them. 3 8 Thus, the "structural restriction" imposes no further "use restriction."
In rejecting Omega's contentions, the court noted that "Virginia
precedent . . . supports the dual effect the chancellor gave the
'single-family dwelling' language,"3 9 and ruled that the covenants
must be read together.40 When the sentences were read together,
the court concluded that "the covenants specify that only dwellings designed structurally for single-family occupancy may be
this environment was to provide full-time supervision, no training of any kind would be
provided to the occupants in the homes. Id. at 16, 319 S.E.2d at 730.
36. Id. at 14-15, 319 S.E.2d at 729 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 16, 319 S.E.2d at 730.
38. Id. at 16-17, 319 S.E.2d at 730.
39. Id. at 17, 319 S.E.2d at 730 (relying on Schwarzschild v. Welborne, 186 Va. 1052, 45
S.E.2d 152 (1947)).
40. Id. at 17, 319 S.E.2d at 731 (relying on Friedberg v. Building Comm., 218 Va. 659, 665,
239 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1977)).
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erected and that the buildings may be used only for single-family
residential purposes. '
As the homeowners appeared to concede that Omega's use of the
proposed buildings would be for residential purposes,4 2 the court
was ultimately faced with the question of whether a group home
for the mentally retarded constituted a "single-family use." Omega
argued that restrictive covenants are to be strictly construed
against the party seeking enforcement. As the covenants in no way
purported to limit the definition of "family," the term should be
interpreted broadly to include mentally retarded persons in group
homes.43 Therefore, Omega concluded that the chancellor's ruling
that "[a] single family use does not include occupancy by unrelated persons" 44 was clearly wrong.
Although the court agreed that covenants are to be strictly construed and that "family" should be interpreted broadly,45 it concluded that "[t]he presence of the counselors in the homes . . .
would convert what might otherwise have been a single-family use
into what the chancellor termed 'a facility.' ,46 Thus, the court upheld the chancellor's ruling that "[a] single family use does not include occupancy by unrelated persons who live in the home with a
counselor.' 47 Additionally, the court rejected any applicability of
the zoning cases from other jurisdictions.48

41. Id. at 18, 319 S.E.2d at 731. The dissent sharply criticized the majority's implication
of a "dual effect" to the "single-family dwelling" language as being contrary to the established principle that restrictive covenants are to be construed narrowly. Justice Thomas
pointed out that the Schwarzschild decision, upon which the majority relied to imply the
"dual-effect" of the term dwelling, struck down an attempt to restrict a use. Thus, the dissent concluded, the majority's reliance upon Schwarzschild was misplaced in upholding a
restriction. Id. at 22-23, 319 S.E.2d at 734 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 18, 319 S.E.2d at 731.
43. Id. at 18-19, 319 S.E.2d at 731.
44. See supra text accompanying note 37.
45. 228 Va. at 19, 319 S.E.2d at 732.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 18, 319 S.E.2d at 731 (emphasis in original). The dissent also criticized the
majority for concluding that four unrelated mentally retarded adults and a counselor did
not fall within the broad definition of "family" while giving no indication of what groups
would be included. Id. at 23, 319 S.E.2d at 734 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 20, 319 S.E.2d at 732. The court held that it was dealing with "private contractual rights arising from restrictive covenants, and not with provisions of zoning ordinances .... [Z]oning ordinances cannot relieve the lots in question from the restrictive covenants to which they are subject." Id. For a discussion of a recent United States Supreme
Court decision dealing with zoning restrictions on group homes for the mentally retarded,
see supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.

